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Rethinking Self-Regulation: Antitrust
Perspectives on Bar Governance Activity
Deborah L. Rhode* and Benjamin H. Barton**
In 1975, one of us (Rhode) was a Yale law student working at
a New Haven legal aid clinic. Like most legal aid offices, both
then and now, the office was under-funded and over-burdened.
Because of a flood of needy clients, the lawyers in these offices
had no choice but to try to triage, choosing cases of greatest need
or greatest impact. Divorce is, and has long been, a particularly
acute area of need. The current demand for legal aid divorce
services is so great that many offices will only handle divorces
where physical abuse is alleged.1
Self-help is one obvious solution for clients that have gone
unserved because of resource constraints. In 1975, the
over-worked lawyers of New Haven’s legal aid clinic responded
by developing a do-it-yourself divorce kit to assist the vast
numbers of poor people left without representation. The local bar
responded by threatening to sue the clinic for unauthorized
practice of law (“UPL”). Precedent at the time suggested that the
suit might be successful, and the staff attorneys decided not to
distribute the kit.2 I was appalled. The bar’s self-interest was
obvious, as was the public’s need for self-help assistance.
Why would the local bar care if a legal aid office helped poor
people seek divorces on their own? Because divorce is a bread
and butter service for “main street” lawyers (small firm and solo
practitioners). Even if many of these folks could not afford a
lawyer anyways, some of them might be able to scrape together
the fees. Further, even if most legal aid clients could not pay for a
lawyer, if do-it-yourself divorce kits help people efficiently

* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal
Profession, Stanford University.
** Helen and Charles Lockett Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of
Tennessee; B.A., Haverford (1991), J.D., Michigan (1996).
1 See Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles
in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 971
n.148 (2004).
2 For a discussion of the law at the time, see Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L.
Rhode, Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 104, 111–13 (1976).
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and effectively, they would eventually enter the market for
middle-class customers.
The bar’s concern continues. For example, when the Texas
Access to Justice Commission tried to move forward with uniform
forms for uncontested divorces, it encountered significant
opposition from the Family Law Section of the Texas Bar.3
Naturally, the Section did not acknowledge that its members
were worried about losing business. Instead, it argued that the
forms were misleading and dangerous, and even questioned
whether there was an actual need for such assistance. It was not
the bar’s finest hour, as was apparent in national media coverage
in The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg News.4 Eventually,
the Texas Supreme Court stepped in and promulgated the
forms over the bar’s objections. But the Family Law Section’s
brazenness in the twenty-first century shows that professional
interests still sometimes trump the public interest.
The bar has long claimed that prohibitions on the UPL
through kits and services are necessary to protect the public.
Evidence for that claim has been notable for its absence. My
reaction to the 1975 experience was to spend the next two years
of law school working on a law review empirical study that
explored the rationale for allowing and increasing pro se legal
services.5 This study found almost no support for the consumer
protection rationale, but ample evidence of protectionism.
Over the last several decades, I have returned to the subject
with depressing regularity. Although the unauthorized practice
doctrine has evolved in progressive directions since the 1970s
and pro se assistance is now widely available, the bar has
continued to attempt to halt this trend. In 2015, I conducted a
study with Lucy Ricca on enforcement activities by unauthorized
practice committees. Like its predecessor, the study found that

3 See Anna Whitney, Some Family Lawyers Oppose Creating Divorce Forms, TEX.
TRIBUNE (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.texastribune.org/2012/01/24/texas-state-bar-askssupreme-court-stop-forms-task/ [http://perma.cc/87WW-XBBL]. For a description of the
controversy, see TEX. SUPREME COURT, ORDER APPROVING UNIFORM FORMS – DIVORCE
SET ONE, http://www.dallascounty.org/distclerk/media/SupOrder.PDF [http://perma.cc/
Q8Z6-42UZ].
4 Nathan Koppel, Divorce-By-Form Riles Texas Bar, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204778604577239480550755826?m
g=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052970204
778604577239480550755826.html&cb=logged0.13556139869615436; For an Easy,
Affordable, Lawyer-Free Divorce, Check ‘Yes,’ BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 4, 2012, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-03-05/for-an-easy-affordable-lawyer-freedivorce-check-yes-view [http://perma.cc/S62C-EB5F].
5 Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note 2, at 105–07.
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most of the current UPL activities seemed more responsive to
professional than public interests.6
Despite forty years of UPL research and critique, the bar has
continued to offer vague and expansive definitions of the practice
of law7 and to enforce them regardless of consumer harm.8
However, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North Carolina
Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission
suggests that these anticompetitive practices may face new
hurdles. 9 If so, society as a whole will benefit.
The discussion that follows proceeds in four parts. Part I
begins by surveying the background of federal antitrust doctrine.
Part II turns to the scope and rationale of the Dental Examiner’s
ruling. Part III offers some thoughts on the implications of the
decision for bar regulatory activities, including a recent example
involving the North Carolina bar’s UPL action against
LegalZoom. Part IV offers some suggestions about how the bar
should proceed going forward.
I.
In 1890, under its power to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress enacted the Sherman Act. Its objective was to impose
some constraints on anticompetitive activity.10 The statute did
not by its terms encompass practices that were the result of
governmental activity. A half-century later, in Parker v. Brown,
the Supreme Court recognized state action immunity from
antitrust liability where states act in their sovereign capacities.11
At issue in the case was California’s agricultural price support
and marketing program for raisins. In the Court’s view,
federalism would be compromised if the Sherman Act were to
ban every instance in which state policies had anticompetitive
effects: “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”12
6 See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the
Public? Rethinking the Professional Monopoly, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2595 (2014).
7 Id. at 2605.
8 Id. at 2598.
9 See N.C. Board of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101,
1117 (2015).
10 See 15 U.S.C.A § 1 (West 2016). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW (4th ed. 2011).
11 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–54 (1942).
12 Id. at 351; see also Ronald E. Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An
Analysis of the State Action Doctrine under the Antitrust Laws, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 31, 74
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Parker stated a relatively broad exception to antitrust
protections, and over the years the Court has gradually clarified
and narrowed its test for state action immunity.13 In California
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., the
Court made clear that a private actor who invokes the state
action exemption must show that that the anticompetitive
restraint is “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy” and is “actively supervised by the State.”14 This
two-pronged test is meant to distinguish private price-fixing
arrangements hiding under “a gauzy cloak of state involvement”
from programs that are truly state-created and carefully
state-managed.15
For almost a century, the legal profession remained free from
federal antitrust liability. Then, in 1975, in a case involving state
bar minimum fee schedules, the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that the Sherman Act was “never intended to include the
learned professions.”16 The case, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
involved home purchasers who could not find an attorney to
assist with their title search at a fee lower than the minimum
established by the Fairfax County Bar Association.17 Although
the Association did not enforce the fee schedule, the Virginia
State Bar, an administrative agent of the Virginia Supreme
Court, condoned it. Indeed, one bar opinion indicated that an
attorney who habitually charged less than the suggested
minimum fee would be presumptively guilty of misconduct.18
According to the Supreme Court, such activities by the state and
local bar should be subject to the Sherman Act.19 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “[i]n
the modern world it cannot be denied that . . . anticompetitive
activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.”20 In
rejecting the bar’s claim of state action immunity, the Court
reasoned that the fee schedule was not an implementation of a
clearly articulated state policy requiring such anticompetitive

(1979) (“State sovereignty is not injured when the federal government validly acts in the
sphere to which it is delimited.”).
13 See C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for
State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1059,
1129 (2000).
14 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980).
15 See Merrick Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 501 (1987).
16 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975).
17 Id. at 775–76.
18 Id. at 777–78.
19 Id. at 791–92.
20 Id. at 788.
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action.21 Nor was the state particularly involved in overseeing or
implementing the schedules.22 Accordingly, it failed both prongs
of the modified Parker test.23 On remand to the lower court, the
Virginia State Bar and Fairfax County Bar Association settled
the case for $200,000.24
However, a decade later in Hoover v. Ronwin, a divided
Supreme Court gave greater latitude to the bar’s anticompetitive
practices. Edward Ronwin failed the Arizona bar examination
and brought suit against the Arizona Supreme Court’s
Committee on Examinations and Admissions under the Sherman
Act.25 He claimed that the Committee had “artificially reduc[ed]
the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona” by
setting passing scores with reference to the number of new
attorneys that the Committee thought appropriate rather than
“with reference to . . . some ‘suitable’ level of competence.”26 The
Committee on Examinations and Admissions was made up of
seven members of the State Bar selected by the Arizona Supreme
Court from a list supplied by the Arizona State Bar Association’s
Board of Governors.27 Thus, the decision-making structure was
somewhat similar to the structure found to be non-state action in
Goldfarb—both relevant state supreme courts delegated
substantial authority to an arm of the bar association.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit had held exactly this in denying
state action protection in its decision in Ronwin.28 However, a
divided Supreme Court disagreed and found that the bar
admission system did not violate the Sherman Act.29 In the
majority’s view, Ronwin’s failure to gain admission was an act of
the state supreme court rather than a state agency or the bar.30
Parker v. Brown controlled, and the challenged action was
“exempt from antitrust liability regardless of the State’s motives
in taking the action.”31
Three justices dissented. They recognized that “[w]hen
[state] authority is delegated to those with a stake in the
competitive conditions within the market, there is a real risk

Id. at 791.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 790.
24 CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 40 n.29 (1986).
25 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 564 (1984).
26 Id. at 565.
27 Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 Ronwin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 696–97 (9th Cir. 1981), as amended
on reh’g.
29 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. at 573.
30 Id. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 580.
21
22
23
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that public power will be exercised for private benefit.”32 In fact,
the dissent noted that these private parties have “used licensing
to advance their own interests in restraining competition at the
expense of the public interest.”33
Ronwin led to a series of lower court opinions upholding ABA
or state bar regulations via state action immunity. For example,
in Lawline v. American Bar Association, Lawline sued the ABA,
the Illinois Supreme Court, and various other bar regulatory
authorities under antitrust law. The suit claimed that Model
Rule 5.4 (which bars lawyers from joining in partnerships with
non-lawyers) and Rule 5.5 (which prohibits lawyers from
assisting in the UPL) violated the Sherman Act.34
Lawline described itself as a free legal advice service
attempting to bridge the access to justice gap:
Lawline [was founded] in 1978 to use law students, paralegals and
lawyers to answer legal questions from the public without charge over
the telephone and to assist them in representing themselves in
routine legal matters. Lawline’s other stated purposes are to refer
members of the public without financial resources to agencies
providing legal services and to refer them to young lawyers who
charge reduced fees, thus creating a “prototype legal delivery system”
subsidized by referral fees. In its ten years of existence, Lawline is
said to have answered legal questions for more than 500,000 people,
particularly in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, and also nationally
through a toll-free telephone number.35

The lawsuit arose after Thomas Holstein, the lawyer who
founded Lawline, tangled with an Illinois bankruptcy court, as
well as the Illinois Supreme Court’s Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission, over UPL and other regulatory issues.
Lawline and Holstein then brought suit against a host of bar
regulators alleging that the Supreme Court of Illinois had
adopted UPL rules and other restrictions based on ABA drafts,
and that the provisions violated the Sherman Act. The plaintiff
lost on a motion to dismiss at the trial court and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held that any harm to the
plaintiff was a result of the actions of the Illinois Supreme Court,
not the ABA, and that the state action doctrine applied.36
Another challenge to ABA actions failed in Massachusetts
School of Law v. American Bar Association. There, the ABA had

32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 585.
Id. at 584.
Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1381–82.
Id. at 1384–85.
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denied a new Massachusetts law school accreditation.37 The
school sued under the Sherman Act, alleging ten restraints
of trade:
(1) [F]ixing the price of faculty salaries; (2) requiring reduced teaching
hours and non-teaching duties; (3) requiring paid sabbaticals; (4)
forcing the hiring of more professors in order to lower student/faculty
ratios; (5) limiting the use of adjunct professors; (6) prohibiting the
use of required or for-credit bar review courses; (7) forcing schools to
limit the number of hours students could work; (8) prohibiting
ABA-accredited schools from accepting credit transfers from
unaccredited schools and from enrolling graduates of unaccredited
schools in graduate programs; (9) requiring more expensive and
elaborate physical and library facilities; and (10) requiring schools to
use the LSAT.38

The Third Circuit cited both Hoover and Lawline and found state
action because it was the Massachusetts Supreme Court, not the
ABA, which had decided to only allow graduates of accredited
schools to sit for the bar.39
Following the Massachusetts School of Law case, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed suit against the ABA for its
law school accreditation practices, alleging some of the same
grounds as the Massachusetts School of Law.40 The ABA and the
DOJ eventually settled the case under a consent decree.41 The
decree limited the ABA’s ability to set minimum salaries for law
professors, but left most other accreditation practices alone. In
Spring 2006, the DOJ asked the court to hold the ABA in civil
contempt over multiple violations of the consent decree. The ABA
acknowledged the violations and reimbursed the United States
$185,000 in fees and costs.42
II.
Taken together, these cases reflect the federal courts’ ability,
but reluctance, to use antitrust law to set limits on lawyer
regulation. In 2002, in an effort to push the doctrine in a more
progressive direction, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
37 Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1031 (3rd
Cir. 1997).
38 Id. at 1031–32.
39 Id. at 1035–36; see also Staver v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 n.7
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (denying an injunction against the ABA for failing to accredit Barry
Law School).
40 United States v. ABA, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996).
41 Id.
42 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Asks Court to Hold
American Bar Association in Civil Contempt (June 23, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/atr/public/press_releases/2006/216804.htm [http://perma.cc/223T-HLFK]. The
decree expired in 2007. Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and
Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 869 (2007).
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convened a State Action Task Force. The Task Force’s objective
was to “identify opportunities to direct the development of case
law in a manner that promotes competition and enhances
consumer welfare.”43 Among the Task Force’s recommendations
was that any quasi-governmental entity should be subject to
antitrust law if it was composed in whole or in part of market
participants or if there was an “appreciable risk that the
anticompetitive conduct at issue [was] the result of a deviation
from state policy.”44 At the same time, the FTC also began a
focused litigation effort to restrain anticompetitive conduct.
Among its targets was the North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners.
Under the governing North Carolina statute, the North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is an “agency of the State”
engaged in the “regulation of the practice of dentistry.”45 The
Board has eight members: six practicing dentists, one dental
hygienist, and one consumer representative appointed by the
governor.46 The Board can promulgate rules and regulations,
subject to approval by the North Carolina Rules Review
Commission, and can bring lawsuits to enjoin the unauthorized
practice of dentistry (“UPD”).47
In response to complaints from dentists concerning teeth
whitening services offered by non-dentists, the Board launched
an investigation. Like UPL, most of the UPD complaints on teeth
whitening “expressed a principal concern with the low prices
charged by non-dentists” as opposed to “possible harm to
consumers.”48 Although there were “[f]ew complaints” of public
injury, the Board issued at least 47 cease and desist letters to
non-dentists who were offering teeth whitening services.49 In
addition, the Board persuaded the North Carolina Board of
Cosmetic Art Examiners to warn cosmetologists not to offer such
services and requested mall operators to consider expelling

43 Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the
Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy (Dec. 10, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/2002/12/looking-forward-federal-trade-commission-and-future-development-us
[http://perma.cc/SK5R-G6MS].
44 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE
STATE ACTION T ASK F ORCE 3 (Sept. 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/report-state-action-task-force-recommendations-clarify-andreaffirm-original-purposes-state-action/stateactionreport_0.pdf (last visited Aug.
19, 2016).
45 N.C. GEN. STATE. ANN. § 90-22 (2013).
46 Id.
47 Id. at §§ 90-48, 90-40.1.
48 N.C. Board of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015).
49 Id.
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them.50 When these enforcement efforts proved successful, the
FTC filed a complaint. The Board invoked state action immunity,
and a divided Supreme Court rejected that defense.
The North Carolina Board majority first found that state
agencies or boards are “nonsovereign” actors and thus not
automatically entitled to state action immunity.51 When “a
controlling number of decisionmakers” on a board are “active
market participants in the occupation the board regulates,” the
board will not enjoy antitrust immunity unless both Midcal
requirements are satisfied: clear articulation of state policy and
active supervision.52 According to the Court, the need for
supervision turns not on the “formal designation given by States
to regulators but on the risk that active participants will pursue
private interests in restraining trade.”53 The majority listed
four minimum criteria for state oversight to qualify as
active supervision:
[1] [T]he supervisor must review the substance of the challenged
conduct, not merely the procedures followed to produce it; [2] the
supervisor must have the power to modify or veto particular decisions
to ensure they accord with state policy; [3] there must be more than
the “mere potential” of state supervision; and [4] the state supervisor
may not itself be an active market participant.54

Because the North Carolina Board had not received
“active supervision” of its efforts to preempt non-dentist
provision of teeth whitening services, state-action immunity
was not available. 55
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
dissented. Rejecting the majority’s view of the Board as a
non-sovereign entity, the dissent accepted the “agency label” that
North Carolina had conferred on the Board by statute.56 In the
dissent’s view, the majority’s approach created numerous
“practical problems.”57 First, the decision could encourage states
to select nonprofessionals to serve on regulatory boards. This
would “compromise the State’s interest in sensibly regulating a
technical profession in which lay people have little expertise.”58

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1116–17 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1122 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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The dissent also worried about ambiguities in interpreting terms,
such as “active market participant.”59
North Carolina Board is one of those ever-rarer cases where
the voting coalitions seem reversed from a political
standpoint. The FTC investigation of the North Carolina Board
started in the administration of George W. Bush.60 The
conservative-leaning Cato Institute filed an amicus
brief supporting the FTC and opposing state immunity.61
The Goldwater Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and
libertarian groups have all lined up against occupational
licensing.62 And yet we find the three most reliably conservative
Justices dissenting, and the liberal wing, joined by Kennedy and
Roberts, dealing a significant blow to many American
occupational licensing regimes.
III.
What impact North Carolina Board will have on state bar
regulation is not yet clear, and the answer will doubtless vary by
state. At issue is governance occurring in three major
contexts: admission, discipline, and the UPL. State supreme
courts control lawyer regulation to a lesser or greater extent in
all fifty states.63 These courts typically have demanding
caseloads, so they delegate their bar governance authority to
other entities. Exactly which entities differs across jurisdictions.
In some states, the supreme court has given all three
responsibilities to one entity, often a state bar association.64 In
other states, these regulatory duties are handled by different
entities.65 Antitrust suits have been brought in all three contexts,

Id. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Muris, supra note 43.
Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, N.C. State Board of Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 13-534, 2014 WL
3895927, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
62 See James Pethokoukis, The Terrible Economic Burden of Occupational Licensing,
AEI IDEAS (Apr. 21, 2014, 1:45 PM), https://www.aei.org/publication/the-terribleeconomic-burden-of-occupational-licensing/ [http://perma.cc/C53V-US5F]; see also Stephen
Slivinski, Bootstraps Tangled in Red Tape, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/free-enterprise/entrepreneurship/bootstrapstangled-in-red-tape/#.Vbf7ULO51vw.facebook [http://perma.cc/BJB2-KF7V]; see also
David S. D’Amato, Occupational Licensing is a Scam, LIBERTARIANISM.ORG (Sept. 9,
2015), http://www.libertarianism.org/columns/occupational-licensing-is-scam
[http://perma.cc/8XPW-5FV3].
63 BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
105 (2011).
64 Id.
65 Robert A. Burgoyne & Mark Emery, State Action Antitrust Immunity in the Wake
of North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commissioner: What
Does it Mean for State Bars and Bar Examiners?, THE BAR EXAM’R 19 (June 2015).
59
60
61
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and their success will depend on the composition of those
governance bodies and the extent of supervision by the state.66
To preempt litigation, some jurisdictions have already
modified governance practices. For example, the Washington bar
has temporarily suspended its ethics committee’s authority to
issue advisory opinions that could be viewed as having
anticompetitive effects.67 The Pennsylvania bar also has
temporarily stopped issuing cease and desist letters and has been
referring UPL complaints to the attorney general.68
Another example of bar regulators proceeding more
cautiously in light of North Carolina Board comes from North
Carolina itself: the settlement of LegalZoom’s UPL battle with
the state bar. The dispute began in 2003, when the North
Carolina bar sent a letter to LegalZoom announcing a UPL
investigation.69 LegalZoom responded with a letter explaining
why the company was in compliance with existing state
standards. At this point, the North Carolina bar agreed and
dismissed the complaint.70
The bar reopened its investigation in 2007, and LegalZoom
again argued that it was not engaged in unauthorized practice of
law.71 This time the bar decided otherwise and sent a cease and
desist order in 2008. LegalZoom again objected and, most
notably, continued to operate in North Carolina without any
significant changes to its practices.72 For observers familiar with
the Internet entrepreneur’s playbook, this strategy should not be
surprising. From Uber to Airbnb, multiple Internet startups have
plowed into legal gray areas, assuming they will be able to grow
fast enough that eventually regulatory resistance will
become futile.73
Id. at 24.
Samson Habte, Washington Bar Suspends Ethics Opinions, Cites Antitrust Fears,
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bna.com/
washington-bar-suspends-n57982065288/ [http://perma.cc/8JZD-YV8C].
68 Kelso L. Anderson, Beware of Boards: Professional Boards Barred From
Anticompetitive Conduct, L ITIG . N EWS (Summer 2015), https://static1.square
space.com/static/577fd873d2b857d5d6ae8164/t/57800a9959cc687a7d59cb71/14680091301
23/Beware+of+Boards+from+Litigation+News+Summer+2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/
ZUW7-JKRR].
69 All of the early, pertinent documents were attached to LegalZoom's initial 2011
complaint. Complaint, LegalZoom.com v. The N.C. State Bar, No. 11-CVS-15111 (Wake
Cnty. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ LegalZoom.pdf
[hereinafter LegalZoom Complaint] [http://perma.cc/FTN9-BZQQ].
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Jordan M. Barry & Elizabeth Pollman, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&
context=law_fac_works [http://perma.cc/K56B-TEZ8].
66
67
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The North Carolina UPL stalemate continued until 2010
when LegalZoom added a “subscription model” of legal advice
along with its interactive forms.74 Because the subscription
model involved pre-payment for legal services, LegalZoom
applied to the North Carolina Bar for approval as a Prepaid
Legal Plan, as required under North Carolina law. In light of
LegalZoom’s continuing presence in North Carolina after a cease
and desist letter, the North Carolina Bar considered this new
application rather cheeky and denied it based upon the ongoing
UPL issues.75
After a few more letters and a clear rejection of LegalZoom’s
prepaid legal services plan, LegalZoom took the unusual step of
transforming from prey into predator. In 2011 it sued the North
Carolina Bar under state constitutional law, the Equal Protection
Clause, and several common law counts.76
This was a gutsy move on LegalZoom’s part, and obviously
not a good idea. The company had never sued a state bar,
although it had been a defendant and settled several of these
cases out of court. In Washington State, LegalZoom paid $20,000
in costs to the bar regulators;77 in Missouri, it paid attorney’s fees
and changed some parts of its site for the state’s customers.78 The
Missouri case was a particularly close call. The District Court
there rejected LegalZoom’s summary judgment motion on
unauthorized practice of law and concluded that LegalZoom’s
interactive forms were very similar to the provision of legal
services by a lawyer, and thus were likely unlawful.79 Although
the company had passively resisted the North Carolina Bar in
the past, there is a substantial difference between ignoring cease
and desist letters and taking the fight to the courts. If LegalZoom
had lost in North Carolina, it would have been a stinging defeat
and might have provided a damaging precedent in other states.
Instead, the gamble paid off. As LegalZoom’s 2011 case
ground on, the Supreme Court decided North Carolina Board of
LegalZoom Complaint, supra note 69.
Id.
Id.
77 Daniel Fisher, Entrepreneurs Versus Lawyers, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/1024/entrepreneurs-lawyers-suh-legalzoom-automatedaniel-fisher.html [http://perma.cc/32ZM-BTCT].
78 Nathan Koppel, Seller of Online Legal Forms Settles Unauthorized Practice of Law
Suit, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/23/seller-ofonline-legal-forms-settles-unauthorized-practiced-of-law-suit/.
79 Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054, 1065 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
For an analysis and some key quotes from the case, see Venkat Balasubramani, Missouri
Federal Court Says LegalZoom Could Be Engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of Law –
Janson v. LegalZoom, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011), http://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/08/missouri_federa_1.htm [http://perma.cc/FQ7U-82LQ].
74
75
76
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Dental Examiners. LegalZoom quickly filed a second lawsuit
against the state bar, this time seeking $10.5 million in damages
and squarely alleging federal antitrust violations based on North
Carolina Board.80 This upped the ante and the state bar
suddenly had to decide whether it was willing risk everything in
its battle with LegalZoom. If LegalZoom prevailed on its
antitrust suit, the bar might lose some or all of its regulatory
power. An aggressive application of North Carolina Board to
lawyers might require removing the bar’s regulatory power
altogether or demanding that the power be shared
with non-lawyers.
Within months, the bar settled both of LegalZoom’s suits.
The terms were very favorable to the company.81 LegalZoom
agreed to have a licensed North Carolina attorney review its
online forms and inform potential customers that its forms are
not a substitute for advice from an attorney.82 LegalZoom argued
that it was already doing that anyway.83 In return, the bar
dropped its UPL fight, and even supported a change in North
Carolina law to make LegalZoom and other form providers more
clearly legal.84 Although this settlement was not explicitly linked
to North Carolina Board, its timing speaks volumes about the
impact that the case could have on bar governance. At a
minimum, it suggests that regulators will tread more carefully
when prosecuting or defining UPL.
North Carolina Board also raises the possibility that the bar
will rethink the role that competitive concerns play in the
accreditation of law schools. As a consequence, the ABA may find
itself between a rock and a hard place because it is also facing
criticisms by the Department of Education for being too lax
in accreditation.85

80 Jacob Gershman, LegalZoom Sues North Carolina Bar, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2015,
7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/legalzoom-sues-carolina-state-bar-news-digest1433720614.
81 See Daniel Fisher, LegalZoom Settles Fight with North Carolina Bar over Online
Law, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2015/10/22/legalzoom-settles-fight-with-north-carolina-bar-over-onlinelaw/#3caa56a0693e
[http://perma.cc/FPN8-8A7B]; Terry Carter, LegalZoom resolves $10.5m antitrust suit
against North Carolina State Bar, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against
_north_carolina_state_bar [http://perma.cc/4QDE-8WKG].
82 Carter, supra note 81.
83 Fisher, supra note 81.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA threatened with 1-Year suspension of law
school accreditation powers, ABA J. (June 24, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/aba_threatened_with_1-year_suspension_of_law_school_accreditation_
powers [http://perma.cc/KT38-ZNCM].
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IV.
After a relatively long period of antitrust immunity, the
American bar suddenly finds itself facing a new regulatory
regime. We have several suggestions for navigation.
First, bar entities should ensure that they are acting in
accordance with a clearly articulated state policy that serves the
public interest. These entities should follow formal rules adopted
by a disinterested body after notice and comment. Bar practices
should also be subject to active supervision, preferably by an
individual or a body other than the state supreme court.86 As
both of us have noted, judges share the background and
worldview of those they claim to regulate.87 After serving their
judicial term, many state supreme court justices return to active
law practice.88 Further, most state judges are elected and depend
on lawyers for endorsements, rankings, and campaign
contributions.89 Even in states where judges are selected through
merit processes, state and local bars exercise substantial
influence.90 The judiciary is also dependent on support from the
organized bar concerning salaries and budgets, and is readily
accessible to informal lawyer lobbying at conferences, annual
meetings, and social gatherings.91 By contrast, consumer
interests rarely have such opportunities for influence. To
minimize the risk that bar regulators will be captured by those
they regulate, states should not rely on the judiciary for
active supervision.92
For example, antirust experts have proposed that:
States can appoint a single employee of the state government with
relevant expertise in a board’s subject area to supervise its activities,
and/or house boards within the relevant state agency and require the
director’s approval to adopt rules and regulations, as is done in Rhode

86 See Ken Friedman, Could Dental–Board Decision Unlock Lawyer Control of State
Bar Regulations?, F ORBES (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2-15/03/04/dental-board-decision-could-unlock-lawyer-control/print/
[http://perma.cc/7BH5-QYTS].
87 DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 89 (2015); Benjamin H. Barton,
Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453,
458 (2008); see also BARTON, supra note 63, at 132–40.
88 Burgoyne & Emery, supra note 65, at 22; Friedman, supra note 86.
89 Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1185, 1198–1200 (2003); BARTON, supra note 87; BARTON, supra note 63.
90 Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of
Judicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 625, 656 (2002); Barton, supra note 89, at 1199–1200.
91 BARTON, supra note 63, at 133; Barton, supra note 87, at 458; Barton, supra note
89, at 1200.
92 Friedman, supra note 86.
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Island . . . . Or states may place their board inside a state agency that
oversees the actions of all professional boards in the state, as is done
to different degrees by California and Utah.93

Some regulatory functions, such as policing unauthorized
practice of law, can be handled by local prosecutors or by states’
attorney generals, who have more public accountability than
state bar committees.94 As Rhode and Ricca’s recent survey of
unauthorized practice enforcement revealed, many bar
committees routinely proceed against lay competitors without
evidence of consumer injury.95 This should cease, and will be
more likely to do so when disinterested decision makers control
enforcement priorities.
States should also rethink the composition of governance
bodies to prevent active market participants from dictating
decisions. No matter how well intentioned, such participants are
likely to lack impartiality in appearance if not in fact.96 Other
nations, such as Great Britain, build in a controlling role for
non-lawyers in their bar governance processes and all the
available evidence suggests that this approach has worked well.97
Although the American bar has historically been reluctant to
relinquish regulatory autonomy, North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners creates a powerful incentive for it to do so. If active
market participants are not controlling members of governance
boards, supervision of their processes is not necessary to avoid
antitrust liability.98

Thirty-five years ago, one of us wrote:
[T]he bar itself has much to gain from abdicating its role as
self-appointed guardian of the professional monopoly. Given mounting
popular skepticism about unauthorized practice enforcement,
prudential as well as well as policy considerations argue for greater
consumer choice . . . . If, as bar spokesmen repeatedly insist, the “fight

93 Austin D. Smith, Logan M. Breed & Robert F. Leibenluft, North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners v. FTC: How States Will Respond to Improve Competition and
Accountability in State Regulatory Boards, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 3–4 (Apr. 2015) (bullet
points omitted from original).
94 See generally Rhode & Ricca, supra note 6.
95 Id.
96 For arguments supporting removal of active market participants from control, see
Smith, Breed, & Liebenluft, supra note 93.
97 For discussion of England’s disciplinary process, see generally Deborah L. Rhode
and Alice Wooley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation: An Agenda for Reform
in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761 (2012).
98 See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
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to stop lay practice is the public’s fight,” it is time for the profession to
relinquish the barricades.99

That time is long overdue. Our hope now is that the Court’s
decision in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners will
supply the necessary nudge.

99 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Perspective on Unauthorized Practice Enforcement, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 98–
99 (1981).

